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On the Proximity of Markets with Integral Equilibria
Siddharth Barman∗ Sanath Kumar Krishnamurthy†
Abstract
We study Fisher markets that admit equilibria wherein each good is integrally assigned to
some agent. While strong existence and computational guarantees are known for equilibria of
Fisher markets with additive valuations [EG59; Orl10], such equilibria, in general, assign goods
fractionally to agents. Hence, Fisher markets are not directly applicable in the context of indivisible
goods. In this work we show that one can always bypass this hurdle and, up to a bounded change
in agents’ budgets, obtain markets that admit an integral equilibrium. We refer to such markets
as pure markets and show that, for any given Fisher market (with additive valuations), one can
efficiently compute a “near-by,” pure market with an accompanying integral equilibrium.
Our work on pure markets leads to novel algorithmic results for fair division of indivisible
goods. Prior work in discrete fair division has shown that, under additive valuations, there al-
ways exist allocations that simultaneously achieve the seemingly incompatible properties of fair-
ness and efficiency [CKM+16]; here fairness refers to envy-freeness up to one good (EF1) and effi-
ciency corresponds to Pareto efficiency. However, polynomial-time algorithms are not known for
finding such allocations. Considering relaxations of proportionality and EF1, respectively, as our
notions of fairness, we show that fair and Pareto efficient allocations can be computed in strongly
polynomial time.
1 Introduction
Fisher markets are fundamental models of resource allocation in mathematical economics [BS00].
Such markets consist of a set of divisible goods along with a set of buyers who have prespecified
budgets and valuations (over all possible bundles of the goods). In this work we focus on the basic
setup wherein the valuations of the buyers are additive. In an equilibrium of a Fisher market, goods
are assigned prices, each buyer spends its entire budget selecting only those goods that provide
maximum value per unit of money spent, and the market clears. The relevance of market equilib-
ria (specifically from a resource-allocation perspective) is substantiated by the first welfare theorem
which asserts that such equilibria are always Pareto efficient [MCWG95, Chapter 16].
The convex program of Eisenberg and Gale provides a remarkable characterization (and, in con-
junction, a proof of existence) of equilibria in Fisher markets with additive valuations: the primal
and dual solutions of their convex program correspond to the equilibrium allocations and prices,
respectively [EG59; NRTV07]. The seminal work of Arrow and Debreu [AD54] further shows that
equilibria exist under more general market models and convex settings; see, e.g., Mas-Colell et
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al. [MCWG95]. The notable aspect of the Eisenberg-Gale characterization is that—in contrast to the
encompassing result of Arrow and Debreu—it provides an efficient method for finding equilibria
under additive valuations. Several algorithmic results have been developed recently for computing
Fisher market equilibria and, in fact, strongly polynomial-time algorithms are known for the additive
case [Orl10; Vég12].
Along with efficiency, market equilibria provide strong fairness guarantees. A well-known re-
sult of Varian [Var74] shows that if in a market all the agents have equal budgets, then any market
equilibrium—specifically called competitive equilibrium from equal incomes (CEEI)—leads to an
envy-free allocation. Envy freeness is a standard solution concept and it deems an (fractional) alloca-
tion of the (divisible) goods to be fair if, under it, each agent prefers its own bundle over that of any
other agent [Fol67].
However, Fisher markets do not yield a representative model in the context of indivisible goods.
Such goods correspond to discrete resources (that cannot be fractionally assigned) and naturally oc-
cur in several allocation problems, e.g., course assignment [OSB10] and inventory pricing [Rot11].
A market equilibrium, in general, requires a fractional assignment of goods to agents. Hence, one
cannot simply consider a market with indivisible goods and expect an equilibrium outcome wherein
the goods do not have to be fractionally assigned. In other words, the desirable market properties of
efficiency, fairness, and computational tractability are somewhat confined to divisible goods.
Our work shows that one can bypass this hurdle and, up to a bounded change in budgets, always
obtain markets that admit integral equilibria. Specifically, we will consider markets that admit an
equilibrium wherein each good is integrally assigned to some agent. We will refer to such Fisher
markets as pure markets. Of cou(rse, not all markets are pure.1 Nevertheless, the present paper shows
that for every Fisher market (with additive valuations) there exists a “nearby” market which admits
an integral equilibrium. Specifically, we prove that for any given marketM one can construct—with
a bounded change in the budgets—a pure marketM′. Here, both the markets have the same set of
agents, goods, and valuations, and the absolute change in any agent’s budget is upper bounded by
‖p‖∞, where p is the equilibrium price vector ofM (Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 3.6).
Note that pure markets enable us to treat indivisible goods as divisible ones and apply standard
(Fisher market) results, such as the first welfare theorem. The fact that the resulting equilibrium is
integral ensures that—independent of the analytic treatment—the final allocation does not require
the discrete goods to be fractionally allocated, i.e., it conforms to a legitimate assignment of the given
indivisible goods.
Pure Markets for Discrete Fair Division. Our work on pure markets leads to novel algorithmic
results for discrete fair division. Specifically, we address fair division of indivisible goods among
agents with additive valuations. Note that there are no monetary transfers in this setup, i.e., unlike
the market setting, here we do not have budgets or prices.
Classical notions of fairness—e.g., envy-freeness and proportionality2—typically address alloca-
tion of divisible goods and are not directly applicable in the discrete setting. For instance, while
an envy-free and proportional allocation of divisible goods always exists [Str80], such an existential
result does not hold when the goods are indivisible.3
1Consider a market of a single good and two agents with equal budgets.
2A division among n agents is said to be proportionally fair iff each agent gets a bundle of value at least 1/n times her
value for the grand bundle of goods.
3If a single indivisible good has to be allocated between two agents, then, under any allocation, the losing agent will be
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To address this issue, in recent years cogent analogues of envy-freeness and proportionality have
been proposed for addressing the discrete version of the fair-division problem. A well-studied solu-
tion concept in this line of work is envy-freeness up to one good [Bud11]: an (integral) allocation is said
to be envy-free up to one good (EF1) iff each agent prefers its own bundle over the bundle of any
other agent up to the removal of one good. Along the lines of EF1, a surrogate of proportionality—
called proportionality up to one good—has also been considered in prior work [CFS17]. In particular, an
allocation is said to be proportional up to one good (PROP1) iff each agent receives its proportional
share after the inclusion of one extra good in its bundle.4
The work of Lipton et al. [LMMS04] shows that as long as the valuations of the agents are mono-
tone an EF1 allocation can be computed efficiently. This result is notably general, since it guarantees
the existence of EF1 allocations under arbitrary, combinatorial (monotone) valuations. Caragian-
nis et al. [CKM+16] established another attractive feature of this solution concept: under additive
valuations, there always exists an allocation which is both EF1 and Pareto optimal (PO). Though,
polynomial-time algorithms are not known for finding such a fair and efficient allocation–the work
of Barman et al. [BKV18] provides a pseudopolynomial time algorithm for this problem.
Under additive valuations, an EF1 allocations is also PROP1. Hence, in the additive-valuations
context, the result of Lipton et al. [LMMS04] is also applicable to PROP1. Similarly, via the existence
result of Caragiannis et al. [CKM+16], we get that if the agents’ valuations are additive, then there
exists an allocation that is both PROP1 and PO.
We will show that—in contrast to the known pseudopolynomial result for finding EF1 and PO
allocations [BKV18]—one can compute allocations that are PROP1 and PO in strongly polynomial
time (Corollary 4.1). This result highlights the applicability of our work on pure markets.
We also consider another, natural relaxation of EF1, which we refer to as EF11: this solution con-
cept requires that any agent i is not envious of any other agent k, up to the inclusion of one good
in i’s bundle and the removal of one good from k’s bundle. We develop an efficient algorithm for
computing allocations of indivisible goods that are simultaneously EF11 and PO (Corollary 4.2).
It is relevant to note that thework of Barman et al. [BKV18] can also be considered as one that finds
pure markets with limited change in budgets. However, in this sense, the result obtained in [BKV18]
is not stronger than the one established in the present paper. That result does provide a stronger fair-
ness guarantee (EF1 and PO in pseudopolynomial time), but one can show that the algorithm devel-
oped in [BKV18] can lead to larger (than the ones obtained in the present paper) perturbations in the
budgets; see Appendix C for a specific market instance in which the current algorithm outperforms
(in terms of budget perturbations) the one developed in [BKV18]. Overall, the pure-market existence
result obtained in this work is not weaker than the one obtained in [BKV18]. Also, in contrast to that
work, the present algorithm runs in strongly polynomial time and is able to address unequal budgets.
Our Techniques: We establish the result for pure markets via a constructive proof. In particular,
we develop an efficient algorithm that starts with an equilibrium of the given market and rounds
its (fractional) allocation to obtain an integral one. In particular, our algorithm integrally assigns all
the goods, which to begin were fractionally assigned. The algorithm does not alter the prices of the
goods. We obtain a pure market at the end by setting the new budgets to explicitly satisfy the budget-
envious and will not achieve proportionality.
4In a fair-division problem with n agents, the proportional share of an agent i is defined to the 1/n times the value that
i has for the entire set of goods.
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exhaustion condition with respect to the computed allocation and the unchanged prices. While the
algorithm is quite direct, the sequence in which it allocates the goods is fairly relevant. A careful
curation ensures that the new budgets are close to the given ones. Notably, in our empirical study
(Section 5), it takes less time to execute this rounding than to compute an equilibrium of the given
Fisher market.
In Section 4 we show that the integral allocation we obtain (via rounding) satisfies notable fairness
and efficiency guarantees. Given that fair-division methods are widely used in practice,5 efficient and
easy-to-implement algorithms—such as the ones developed in this work—have a potential for direct
impact.
Additional RelatedWork: An interestingwork of Babaioff et al. [BNTC17] considersmarketswherein
the indivisibility of goods is explicitly enforced. In particular, in their framework each agent selects
its most preferred subset of goods, among all subsets that satisfy the budget constraint. Hence, frac-
tional selection/allocations are ruled out in this setup. For such integral markets, existence of equi-
libria is not guaranteed. By contrast, we solely focus on pure/fractional markets, wherein equilibria
necessarily exist. The key distinction here is that a pure market is a fractional market that happens to
admit an integral equilibria. While a pure market is integral in the sense of Babaioff et al. [BNTC17],
the indivisibility of goods is not explicitly enforced in this framework.
Babaioff et al. [BNTC17] characterize the existence of equilibria in integral markets with two
agents, at most five goods, and generic budgets. On the other hand, this paper establishes that, in the
space of Fisher markets, pure (and, hence, integral) markets are dense, up to bounded perturbations
in the budgets.
2 Notation and Preliminaries
Fisher market is a tuple M := 〈[n], [m],V, e〉 wherein [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n} denotes the set of agents,
[m] = {1, 2, . . . ,m} denotes the set of goods, V = {v1, v2, . . . , vn} denotes the valuation profile, and
e = (e1, e2, . . . , en) denotes the budget vector. The valuation profile V specifies the cardinal prefer-
ences of each agent i ∈ [n] over the set of goods [m] via a valuation function vi : [0, 1]
m 7→ R≥0. For
any agent i ∈ [n], the parameter ei ∈ R+ represents agent i’s budget/endowment.
A bundle of goods is a vector s = (s1, s2, . . . , sm) ∈ [0, 1]
m in which sj represents the allocated
quantity of the good j. In particular, the value that an agent i ∈ [n] has for a bundle s ∈ [0, 1]m is
denoted as vi(s). A bundle s is said to be integral if under it each good is allocated integrally, i.e., for
each j ∈ [m] we have sj ∈ {0, 1}. Note that an integral bundle s corresponds to the subset of goods
{j ∈ [m] | sj = 1}. If s is an integral bundle, we will overload notation and let s also denote the
corresponding subset of goods, i.e., s := {j ∈ [m] | sj = 1}.
Throughout, we will assume that agents have nonnegative and additive valuations, i.e., for each
agent i ∈ [n] and any bundle s, we have vi(s) :=
∑
j∈[m] vi,jsj , where vi,j ≥ 0 denotes the value
agent i has for good j.
Allocation: An allocation x ∈ [0, 1]n×m refers to a collection of n bundles (x1,x2, . . . ,xn) where
xi = (xi,1, xi,2, . . . , xi,m) ∈ [0, 1]
m is the bundle allocated to agent i ∈ [n]. Furthermore, in an alloca-
tion at most one unit of each good is allocated, i.e., for all j ∈ [m], we have
∑
i∈[n] xi,j ≤ 1. In other
5See, e.g., Spliddit [GP15]: http://www.spliddit.org/
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words, an allocation corresponds to a fractional allocation of the goods among the agents. We will
say that an allocation x is integral iff its constituent bundles are integral, x ∈ {0, 1}n×m.
Market outcome and equilibrium: For a Fisher marketM = 〈[n], [m],V, e〉, a market outcome is tuple
(x,p) where x ∈ [0, 1]n×m corresponds to an allocation and the price vector p = (p1, p2, . . . , pm)
associates a price pg ∈ R≥0 with each good g ∈ [m].
Given a price vector p, writeMBBi to denote the set of goods that provide agent i the maximum
possible utility per unit of money spent, MBBi := {g ∈ [m] | vi,g/pg ≥ vi,j/pj for all j ∈ [m]}.
MBBi is called the maximum bang-per-buck set of agent i (under the price vector p) and, for ease
of presentation, we will denote the maximum bang-per-buck ratio by MBBi as well, i.e., MBBi :=
maxj∈[m] vi,j/pj .
An outcome (x,p) is said to an equilibrium of a Fisher marketM = 〈[n], [m],V, e〉 iff it satisfies the
following conditions:
• Market clearing: each good g ∈ [m] is either priced at zero, pg = 0, or it is completely allocated,∑n
i=1 xi,g = 1.
• Budget exhaustion: Agents spend their entire budget, i.e., for all i ∈ [n], the following equality
holds
∑
g∈[m] xi,gpg = xi · p = ei.
• Maximum bang-per-buck allocation: Each agent i ∈ [n] spends its budget only on optimal goods,
i.e., if xi,g > 0 for good g ∈ [m], then g ∈ MBBi.
We will explicitly use the term integral equilibrium to refer to a market equilibrium (x,p) in which
the allocation x is integral.
Recall that equilibria of markets (with additive valuations) correspond to optimal solutions of
the Eisenberg-Gale convex program [EG59; NRTV07]. Furthermore, in the additive case, strongly
polynomial-time algorithms exist for finding market equilibria [Orl10; Vég12].
The first welfare theorem ensures that equilibrium allocations are Pareto efficient, i.e., satisfy a
standard measure of economic efficiency. Specifically, for an instance 〈[n], [m],V〉, an allocation x ∈
[0, 1]n×m is said to be Pareto dominated by another allocation y ∈ [0, 1]n×m if vi(yi) ≥ vi(xi), for each
agent i ∈ [n], and vk(yk) > vk(xk) for some agent k ∈ [n]. That is, compared to allocation x, every
agent is better off under y and at least one agent is strictly better off. An allocation is said to be Pareto
efficient or Pareto optimal (PO) if it is not Pareto dominated by any other allocation.
Definition 2.1 (Fractionally Pareto Efficient Allocation). An allocation is said to be fractionally Pareto
efficient (fPO) iff it is not Pareto dominated by any fractional allocation y ∈ [0, 1]n×m.
Note that an integral allocation x ∈ {0, 1}n×m can be fPO.
Proposition 2.1 (First Welfare Theorem; Mas-Colell et al. ([MCWG95, Chapter 16])). If (x,p) is an
equilibrium of a Fisher market with additive valuations, then the equilibrium allocation x is fractionally Pareto
efficient (fPO).
Along with efficiency, market equilibria are known to fair. In particular, if in a market all the
agents have equal endowments, then any market equilibrium—specifically called competitive equi-
librium from equal incomes (CEEI)—leads to an envy-free allocation [Var74]. Envy freeness is a stan-
dard solution concept and it deems an allocation x to be fair if, under it, each agent prefers its own
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bundle over that of any other agent: vi(xi) ≥ vi(xk) for all i, k ∈ [n] [Fol67]. Hence, using Proposi-
tion 2.1 and the result of Varian [Var74], we get that CEEI are both fair and efficient.
However, as observed earlier, equilibrium allocations are not guaranteed to be integral. That
is, with indivisible goods, one can not directly apply the market framework and hope to retain the
desirable properties of efficiency, fairness, computational tractability, or even universal existence.
Our work shows that interestingly, up to a bounded change in the endowments, one can always
bypass this hurdle and obtain integral equilibria. Towards this end, the following notion will be
useful.
Definition 2.2 (Pure Market). A Fisher market is said to be pure iff it admits an integral equilibrium.
As mentioned previously, pure markets enable us to treat indivisible goods as divisible ones and
apply standard (Fisher market) results, such as the first welfare theorem. The fact that the resulting
equilibrium is integral ensures that—independent of the analytic treatment—the final allocation does
not require the discrete goods to be fractionally allocated, i.e., it conforms to a legitimate assignment
of the given indivisible goods.
Spending Graph: We will use the construct of a spending graph to state and analyze our algorithm.
Given a market M = 〈[n], [m],V, e〉 along with an outcome (x,p), the spending graph G(x,p) is a
weighted bipartite graph whose (bipartition) vertex sets correspond to the set of agents [n] and the
set of goods [m], respectively. In the spending graph, we have an edge (i, j) between agent i and
good j if and only if xi,j > 0. The weight of any edge (i, j) in G(x,p) is the amount that agent i is
spending on good j, i.e., weight of edge (i, j) is xi,jpj .
Given a Fisher marketM and an equilibrium (x,p), it is always possible to rearrange the spend-
ing so that the spending graph is a forest, i.e., we can, in strongly polynomial time, find an x′ such
that (x′,p) is an equilibrium ofM and G(x′,p) is a forest. This fact has been used in computing mar-
ket equilibrium for markets [Orl10] and for approximating the Nash social welfare objective [CG15].
For completeness, we provide a proof of this result in Appendix A.
Claim 2.2. Given a Fisher marketM and its equilibrium (x,p), we can find—in strongly polynomial time—
an (fractional) allocation x′ such that (x′,p) is also an equilibrium ofM and G(x′,p) is a forest.
3 On the Proximity of Pure Markets
The main result of this section shows that for every Fisher market there always exists a “nearby”
market which is pure. Our proof of this result is constructive. In particular, we develop a strongly
polynomial-time algorithm (Alg) that, for any given marketM = 〈[n], [m],V, e〉 and its equilibrium
(x,p), finds a pure marketM′ = 〈[n], [m],V, e′〉 such that the absolute perturbation in endowments
is at most ‖p‖∞, i.e., ‖e− e
′‖∞ ≤ ‖p‖∞. Alg also computes an integral equilibrium (x
′,p) ofM′.
Theorem 3.1 (Main Result). Given a Fisher market M = 〈[n], [m],V, e〉 with additive valuations and its
equilibrium (x,p), we can find—in strongly polynomial time—a budget vector e′ and an integral allocation
x
′ such that
• (x′,p) is an integral equilibrium of the marketM′ = 〈[n], [m],V, e′〉.
• The budget vector e′ is close to e: ‖e′ − e‖∞ ≤ ‖p‖∞. In addition,
∑n
i=1 e
′
i =
∑n
i=1 ei.
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Note that (in contrast to computing an arbitrary equilibrium) finding an integral equilibrium is
computationally hard, i.e., determiningwhether a given Fisher market is pure is an NP-hard problem
(Appendix B). Hence, a notable aspect of Alg is that it, along with a pure market, finds an accompa-
nying integral equilibrium.
3.1 Rounding Algorithm
Recall that, for any given marketM and its equilibrium (x,p), we can assume, without loss of gen-
erality, that the spending graph G(x,p) is a forest. Our algorithm, Alg, constructs a new (integral)
allocation x′ by iteratively assigning goods to agents until all the goods are allocated. In Alg, we
initialize G to be the spending forest G(x,p) and root each tree in G at some agent. Then, we assign
child goods to agents i ∈ [n] with no parents (i.e., to root agents), until adding any more child good
to i would violate i’s original endowment (i.e., budget constraint) ei. The remaining child goods are
then appropriately assigned to grandchildren agents. After each such distribution, we delete this
parent agent i and all of its child goods (that have now been alloted). Overall, we repeat this specific
method of distributing goods until G is empty.
ALGORITHM: Alg
Input : A Fisher marketM = 〈[n], [m],V , e〉with additive valuations and an equilibrium (x,p) ofM.
Output : An integral allocation x′ and a budget vector e′ such that (x′,p) is an integral equilibrium of the
marketM′ = 〈[n], [m],V , e′〉 and ‖e′ − e‖∞ ≤ ‖p‖∞
1 Set x′ ← (∅, ∅, . . . , ∅), i.e., for any agent iwe initialize x′i ← ∅
/* We construct x′ by assigning goods to agents until all goods are allocated */
2 Initialize G to be the spending forest of (x,p), i.e., G← G(x,p)
/* Whenever we allocate a good, we delete the corresponding vertex from G. */
3 Root each tree in the forest G at some agent
4 Allocate all leaf goods to parent agents
/* That is, for all j ∈ [m] if xi,j = 1 then x′i ← x
′
i ∪ {j} and delete j from G. */
5 while there is an agent i with no parent (i.e., i is a root node) in G do
6 while there is a good g in the neighborhood of i (i.e., edge (i, g) is in G) such that p(x′i ∪ {g}) ≤ ei do
7 Allocate g to agent i: update x′i ← x
′
i ∪ {g} and delete g from G.
8 end
9 Allocate every remaining child j of i to any (agent) child k of j and delete j from G. Here, i and k are
agents and j is a good
/* That is, before agent i’s deletion, its grandchildren inherit the remaining child
goods of i */
10 Delete agent i from G.
11 end
12 e
′ ← (p(x′1),p(x
′
2), . . . ,p(x
′
n))
The integral allocation x′ we construct is a rounding of the allocation x. In particular, if a good is
integrally allocated to agent i under x, then it will continue to be assigned to i in x′. Hence, the focus
here is to analyze the assignment of goods which are fractionally allocated (i.e., are not integrally
allocated) in x. We will use the term contested goods to refer to goods that are fractionally allocated in
x. Note that all the goods considered in the nested while-loops of Alg are contested.
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3.2 Proof for Theorem 3.1
The runtime analysis of Alg is direct and leads to following proposition.
Proposition 3.2. Alg runs in strongly polynomial time.
In Lemma 3.4 we will show that the output of Alg, i.e., (x′,p), is an equilibrium of marketM′ =
〈[n], [m],V, e′〉. Lemma 3.5 asserts that the computed endowments e′ are close to given budgets e.
Together, Lemma 3.4 and Lemma 3.5 directly imply Theorem 3.1.
The following supporting claim shows that Alg maintains a useful invariant.
Claim 3.3. Throughout the execution of Alg, the graph G is a forest. In addition, the root and leaves of every
tree in G correspond to agents (i.e., are agent nodes).
Proof. The graph G is initialized to be the spending forest, and throughout Alg we only delete ver-
tices from G, without ever adding an edge. Hence, G continues to be a forest.
To establish the property about leaf nodes in G, note that in Step 4 we assign all the leaves which
correspond to goods. Therefore, before the while-loop begins, all leaf nodes correspond to agents. If,
for contradiction, we assume that a node j ∈ [m]—which corresponds to a good—becomes a leaf at
some point of time, then this must have happened due to the deletion of j’s child node i ∈ [n] (which
corresponds to an agent). However, we delete an agent node i only if it has no parent in G (this is
exactly the case in which i is considered in the outer while-loop). This contradicts that fact that Alg
would have deleted i, implying that a node j (which corresponds to a good) never becomes a leaf in
G.
Finally, note that at the beginning of Alg the root nodes correspond to agents: in Step 3 we
explicitly root the trees of G at agent nodes. As before, if we assume, for contradiction, that a good
node j ∈ [m] becomes a root at some point of time, then this must have happened due to the deletion
of j’s parent node i ∈ [n] (which corresponds to an agent). However, we delete an agent node i only
after all of i’s child nodes (which includes j) have been assigned (see Step 9). Therefore, before i’s
deletion we would have assigned j to a grandchild of i (who is guaranteed to exist, due to the fact
that j is not a leaf node). That is, Alg would have deleted j (from G) before i, contradicting the
assumption that j ends up being a root node. Hence, the stated claim follows for the root nodes as
well.
Lemma 3.4. For a given marketM = 〈[n], [m],V, e〉 (with additive valuations) and equilibrium (x,p), let x′
and e′, respectively, be the allocation and the endowment vector computed by Alg. Then, (x′,p) is an integral
equilibrium of the marketM′ = 〈[n], [m],V, e′〉.
Proof. We will first show that Alg ends up allocating every good. For any good j ∈ [m], consider
the iteration in which its parent node i ∈ [n] is being considered in the outer while-loop, i.e., the loop
after which i gets deleted. Note that the parent node i is guaranteed to exist since j is never a root
(Claim 3.3). Furthermore, the algorithm does not terminate till it deletes all the agent nodes from G,
hence there necessarily exists a point of time when the agent node i is under consideration.
By construction, good j either gets assigned to i or to a grandchild k ∈ [n] of node i; Claim 3.3
ensures that k exists. Hence, we get that all goods are allocated/deleted from G over the course of
the algorithm. Hence, the integral allocation x′ satisfies the market clearing condition.
By construction, the allocation x′, returned byAlg, is a rounding of the allocation x. In particular,
for every agent i ∈ [n], the set of goods that i spends on in x′ is a subset of the goods that i spends on
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in x, i.e., x′i ⊆ {j ∈ [m] | xi,j > 0}. Therefore, analogous to x, in x
′ agents spend only on maximum
bang-per-buck goods, x′i ⊆ MBBi; note that the prices of the goods remain unchanged. Moreover,
the budget vector e′ is chosen to satisfy the budget exhaustion condition. Hence (x′,p) is an integral
equilibrium of the marketM′.
Lemma 3.5. For any given market M = 〈[n], [m],V, e〉 (with additive valuations) and equilibrium (x,p),
the budget vector e′ computed by Alg satisfies ‖e′ − e‖∞ ≤ ‖p‖∞ and
∑n
i=1 e
′
i =
∑n
i=1 ei.
Proof. In the while-loops of Alg an agent can receive only contested goods: either the parent good
and/or its child goods. Agents that have no children in G (at the beginning of the while loops) or are
isolated satisfy the endowment bound directly; such an agent i has at most one contested good, its
parent ĝ, and we have ei − pĝ ≤ e
′
i ≤ ei + pĝ. Recall that p(xi) = ei. Hence, to complete the proof we
now need to obtain the endowment bounds for agents that have child nodes.
Note that the child nodes (goods) of an agent i are never deleted before i. The child goods are
allocated/deleted only when agent i is selected in the outer while-loop. If an agent i has children, but
it does not receive any of its child nodes, then it must be the case that i’s endowment is high enough
to not accommodate any child, g. Specifically, we have p(x′i)+ pg > ei, i.e., e
′
i ≥ ei− pg. Furthermore,
in this case, the only good that i may have received during the execution of the while-loops is its
parent good, ĝ, hence e′i ≤ ei + pĝ.
The remainder of the analysis addresses agents who have children and receive at least one of their
child nodes (goods). For such agents, the condition of the inner while-loop ensures that we never over
allocate child nodes, e′i = p(x
′
i) ≤ ei. We will establish a lower bound for e
′
is by considering different
cases based on whether an agent i ∈ [n] receives all of its child nodes or just some of them. Here, we
write ĝ ∈ [m] to denote the parent good of agent i in G.
• If an agent i receives all of its child nodes, then e′i = p(x
′
i) ≥ p(xi) − pĝ; here, the subtracted
term, pĝ, accounts for the fact that i might not have received its parent good ĝ. Hence, in this
case we have e′i ≥ ei − pĝ.
• In case agent i does not receive a child good g, from the condition in the inner while-loop, we
get p(x′i)+ pg > ei. Otherwise, child g would have been included in x
′
i. Therefore, e
′
i = p(x
′
i) ≥
ei − pg and we get a lower bound in this case as well.
Overall, the endowments satisfy ‖e′ − e‖∞ ≤ ‖p‖∞.
Note that Alg does not modify the prices of the goods. Since both the marketsM andM′ have
the same equilibrium prices p, the budget-exhaustion and market-clearing conditions ofM andM′
give us:
∑
i e
′
i =
∑
j pj =
∑
i ei.
Remark 3.1. The proof of Lemma 3.5 shows that if e′i < ei then there exists a good g /∈ x
′
i that was
fractionally allocated to i under x (i.e., xi,g > 0) such that ei ≤ e
′
i + pg. Note that for such a good g
(via the maximum bang-per-buck condition in the definition of an equilibrium) we have g ∈ MBBi.
The analysis also ensures that if e′i > ei, then there exists a good ĝ ∈ x
′
i ⊆ MBBi (specifically, the
parent of i) such that e′i ≤ ei + pĝ.
From Proposition 3.2, Lemma 3.4, and Lemma 3.5, we directly obtain Theorem 3.1.
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3.3 An Extension of Theorem 3.1
The fact that Theorem 3.1 requires an equilibrium of the given market is not a computational hurdle.
The work of Orlin [Orl10] provides a strongly polynomial-time algorithm for computing an equilib-
rium (x,p) of a given Fisher marketM. Hence, Theorem 3.1, along with the result of Orlin [Orl10],
leads to the following algorithmic result.
Theorem 3.6. Given m goods, n agents with additive valuations, V = {v1, . . . , vn}, and a budget vector e.
In (strongly) polynomial time, we can find a budget vector e′, an integral allocation x′, and a price vector p
such that:
• (x′,p) is an integral equilibrium of the (pure) marketM′ = 〈[n], [m],V, e′〉.
• The budget vector e′ is close to e: ‖e′ − e‖∞ ≤ ‖p‖∞ and
∑n
i=1 e
′
i =
∑n
i=1 ei.
4 Pure Markets for Discrete Fair Division
The section addresses the problem of fairly dividingm indivisible goods among a set of n agents with
nonnegative, additive valuations V = {v1, v2, . . . , vn}. We will denote an instance of a fair division
problem as a tuple I = 〈[n], [m],V〉.6 Note that for each agent i ∈ [n] the valuation for a subset of
goods S ⊆ [m] satisfies vi(S) =
∑
j∈S vi,j , where vi,j ∈ R+ is the value that agent i has for good j.
A prominent solution concept in discrete fair division is envy-freeness up to one good. Formally, for
a fair-division instance I = 〈[n], [m],V〉, an integral allocation x = (x1,x2, . . . ,xn) ∈ {0, 1}
n×m is said
to be envy-free up to one good (EF1) iff for every pair of agents i, k ∈ [n] there exists a good g ∈ xk
such that vi(xi) ≥ vi(xk \ {g}).
Strong existential guarantees are known for EF1, even under combinatorial valuations: it is show
in [LMMS04] that as long as the valuations of the agents are monotone an EF1 allocation exists and
can be computed efficiently. Caragiannis et al. [CKM+16] prove that, in the case of additive val-
uations, this notion of fairness is compatible with (Pareto) efficiency, i.e., there exists an allocation
which is both EF1 and Pareto optimal (PO). However, polynomial-time algorithms are not known
for finding such allocations–prior work [BKV18] provides a pseudopolynomial time algorithm for
this problem.
Along the lines of EF1, a surrogate of proportionality—called proportionality up to one good—has
also been considered previously [CFS17]. Formally, an allocation x = (x1,x2, . . . ,xn) is said to be
proportional up to one good (PROP1) iff for every agent i ∈ [n] there exists a good g ∈ [m] such
that vi(xi ∪ {g}) ≥ vi([m])/n. Write Propi to denote the proportional share of agent i, i.e., Propi :=
vi([m])/n.
Under additive valuations, EF1 allocations are also PROP1. Hence, the result of Lipton et al. [LMMS04]
implies that PROP1 allocations exist when the valuations are additive. Similarly, via [CKM+16], we
get that if the agents’ valuations are additive, then there exists an allocation that is both PROP1 and
PO.
We will show that—in contrast to the known pseudopolynomial results for finding EF1 and fPO
allocations [BKV18]—one can compute allocations that are PROP1 and fPO in strongly polynomial
6We do not have budgets or prices in the fair division setup.
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time (Corollary 4.1).7 Finding a PROP1 and PO allocation in polynomial time was identified as an
open question in [CFS17], and our algorithmic result for this problem highlights the applicability of
Theorem 3.6 in the context of fair division of indivisible goods.
In addition, we prove a similar result for a natural relaxation of EF1, which we call envy-free up
to addition of a good in the first bundle and removal of another good from the other bundle (EF11).
Formally, an integral allocation x = (x1,x2, . . . ,xn) is said to be EF
1
1 iff for every pair of agents
i, k ∈ [n], there exist goods g1 ∈ [m] and g2 ∈ xk, such that vi(xi ∪ {g1}) ≥ vi(xk \ {g2}). Corollary 4.2
shows that an integral allocation, which is both EF11 and fPO, can be computed efficiently.
Corollary 4.1. Given a fair-division instance with indivisible goods and additive valuations, in strongly poly-
nomial time we can compute an integral allocation a which is both PROP1 (fair) and fPO (efficient).
Proof. Given a fair-division instance I = 〈[n], [m],V〉, we construct a FishermarketM = 〈[n], [m],V, e =
~1〉 by setting the endowment of each agent equal to one. Theorem 3.6 shows that in strongly polyno-
mial time we can compute an equilibrium (x,p) of the marketM and, then, round x to an integral
allocation a and obtain a budget vector e′ such that (a,p) is a integral equilibrium of the market
M′ = 〈[n], [m],V, e′〉 and the budget vector e′ is close to e = ~1; in particular, ‖e′ −~1‖∞ ≤ ‖p‖∞.
Since a is an equilibrium of the Fisher marketM′, via the first welfare theorem (Proposition 2.1),
we know that a is fPO. Next, we will prove that a is PROP1 as well.
The conditions that define an equilibrium ensure that for all agents i ∈ [n] and goods g ∈ ai (i.e.,
the goods that are allocated to i in a) we have
vi,g
pg
= MBBi := maxj′∈[m]
vi,j′
pj′
.8 The proof of Lemma 3.5
further provides the guarantee that if e′i < ei, then there exists a good g ∈ MBBi such that e
′
i ≥ ei−pg
(Remark 3.1). Using these facts we will perform a case analysis to show that allocation a satisfies the
stated fairness guarantee:
• If p(ai) = e
′
i < ei = 1, then there exists a good g ∈ MBBi such that p(ai ∪ {g}) ≥ 1. Therefore,
vi(ai ∪ {g}) = MBBi p(ai ∪ {g}) (vi is additive and ai ⊆ MBBi)
≥ MBBi · 1 (p(ai ∪ {g}) ≥ 1)
= MBBi · p([m])/n (p([m]) =
∑
i ei = n)
≥ vi([m])/n (MBBi pj ≥ vi,j for all goods j)
= Propi
• If p(ai) = e
′
i ≥ ei = 1, then
vi(ai) = MBBi p(ai) (ai ⊆ MBBi)
≥ MBBi · 1
= MBBi p([m])/n
≥ vi([m])/n
= Propi.
Overall, we get that for any fair-division instance I , a PROP1 and fPO allocation can be computed
in strongly polynomial time.
7Recall that fPO is a stronger solution concept thatPO, since it requires that an allocation is not Pareto dominated by any
fraction (and, hence, any integral) allocation. On the other hand, PO rules out domination solely by integral allocations.
8Note that the prices of the goods are the same under the two equilibria (x,p) and (a,p).
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Next, we provide a strongly polynomial-time algorithm for finding integral allocations that are
simultaneously EF11 and fPO.
Corollary 4.2. Given a fair-division instance with indivisible goods and additive valuations, in strongly poly-
nomial time we can compute an integral allocation a which is both EF11 and fPO.
Proof. Given a fair-division instance I = 〈[n], [m],V〉, we construct a FishermarketM = 〈[n], [m],V, e =
~1〉 by setting the endowment of each agent equal to one. Theorem 3.6 shows that in strongly polyno-
mial time we can compute an equilibrium (x,p) of the marketM and, then, round x to an integral
allocation a and obtain a budget vector e′ such that (a,p) is a integral equilibrium of the market
M′ = 〈[n], [m],V, e′〉 and the budget vector e′ is close to e = ~1; in particular, ‖e′ −~1‖∞ ≤ ‖p‖∞.
As noted in Remark 3.1, in this construction, for each agent i ∈ [n] we have |e′i − ei| ≤ pg where g
is in fact a good that is fractionally allocated to i under x, i.e., xi,g > 0. Therefore, the following two
properties hold
P1: For each agent i ∈ [n], there exists a good g1 ∈ MBB1 such that p(ai ∪ {g1}) ≥ 1.
If p(ai) = e
′
i < 1,
9 then this inequality follows from the first part of Remark 3.1. Otherwise, if
p(ai) = e
′
i ≥ 1, then the inequity holds trivially–the prices are nonnegative.
P2: For each agent k ∈ [n], there exists a good g2 ∈ ak ⊆ MBBk such that p(ak \ {g2}) ≤ 1.
If p(ak) = e
′
k > 1, then (as stated in the second part of Remark 3.1) we have a good g2 ∈ ak ⊆
MBBk such that p(ak \ {g2}) ≤ 1. For the complementary case, p(ak) = e
′
k ≤ 1, this inequality
directly holds.
Properties P1 and P2 imply that allocation a is EF11 (here, for any two agents i and k we select
goods g1 and g2 as specified in the two properties, respectively):
vi(ai ∪ {g1}) = MBBi p(ai ∪ {g1}) (ai ⊆ MBBi and g1 ∈MBBi)
≥ MBBi · 1 (P1)
≥ MBBi p(ak \ {g2}) (P2)
≥ vi(ak \ {g2}) (MBBi pj ≥ vi,j for all goods j)
5 Some Empirical Results
For an experimental analysis of Alg, we generate random instances of Fisher markets with equal
incomes (e = ~1) and number of agents n ∈ {2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64}. For each n, the number of goods are
kept to be five times the number of agents (m = 5n) and we run the experiment 100 times. Agents’
valuations for the goods are selected uniformly at random from the set S = {22
k−1
| k ∈ [10]} (i.e., for
any agent i ∈ [n] and any good j ∈ [m] we pick vi,j uniformly at random from the set S). Generating
the valuations this way helps avoid convergence issues while solving the Eisenberg-Gale convex
program.
9By construction, ei = 1.
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Given a Fisher marketM = 〈[n], [5n],V,~1〉, we compute its equilibrium allocation (x) using pro-
jected gradient ascent on the corresponding Eisenberg-Gale convex program.10 In addition, we find
an equilibrium price vector (p) using the equilibrium conditions. Then, we update x using Algo-
rithm 2 (Appendix A) to ensure that that its spending graph is a forest and, finally, execute Alg on
the input (M, (x,p)). Note that while there are sophisticated algorithms to compute exact equilib-
rium of Fisher markets in strongly polynomial time [Orl10; Vég12], we use the projected gradient
ascent for ease of implementation and convergence speed.
Our empirical results appear in Table 1. As established in Corollary 4.1 and Corollary 4.2, the
above procedure always finds an allocation which is PROP1 and EF11. In fact, for about 96% of the
(randomly generated) instances, the implemented method finds an envy-free allocation. This sug-
gests that, in practice, our algorithms outperform our theoretical guarantees. In addition, we find
that it takes notably less time to execute the rounding method than to compute a market equilibrium
(i.e., solve the Eisenberg-Gale program).
Table 1: Empirical Results
Number of agents (n) n = 2 n = 4 n = 8 n = 16 n = 32 n = 64
Number of goods (m) m = 10 m = 20 m = 40 m = 80 m = 160 m = 320
Mean run-time of Gradient Ascent 1.104 sec 1.621 sec 2.067 sec 2.869 sec 5.593 sec 6.559 sec
Mean run-time of Algorithm 2 0.0007 sec 0.005 sec 0.020 sec 0.067 sec 0.198 sec 1.033 sec
Mean run-time of Alg 0.0002 sec 0.0005 sec 0.0007 sec 0.002 sec 0.007 sec 0.025 sec
Max run-time of Gradient Ascent 1.747 sec 3.897 sec 4.155 sec 10.006 sec 29.11 sec 7.788 sec
Max run-time of Algorithm 2 0.001 sec 0.011 sec 0.050 sec 0.109 sec 0.299 sec 1.329 sec
Max run-time ofAlg 0.001 sec 0.005 sec 0.002 sec 0.004 sec 0.012 sec 0.038 sec
Number of EF allocations (out of 100) 99 86 95 99 98 100
Number of EF1 allocations (out of 100) 100 86 95 99 98 100
Number of EF11 allocations (out of 100) 100 100 100 100 100 100
Number ofProp allocations (out of 100) 99 86 96 100 100 100
Number of PROP1 allocations (out of 100) 100 100 100 100 100 100
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A Proof of Claim 2.2
ALGORITHM 2: Procedure to rearrange spending so that spending graph is a forest.
Input: A Fisher marketM and its equilibrium (x,p).
Output: An equilibrium (x′,p) ofM with the property that G(x′,p) is a forest.
1 x
′ ← x.
2 while there is a cycle in G(x′,p). do
3 Let G← G(x′,p) and for any edge (i, j) let wi,j := x′i,jpj denote its weight in G.
4 Find a cycle C in G.
5 Find a least weight edge on the cycle C and let w be the weight of this edge.
/* i.e., we pick an edge from the set argmin(i,j)∈C x
′
i,jpj. */
6 In the graph G, alternatingly add and subtract the weight w from the edges of the cycle C so that the least
weight edge gets deleted.
7 For all (i, j) ∈ C, x′i,j ← wi,j/pj .
In this section we will show that Algorithm 2 finds, in strongly polynomial time, an allocation x′
that satisfies Claim 2.2. Algorithm 2 initializes x′ to be the input allocation x and keeps iteratively
modifying x′. In every iteration of the while-loop, an edge which was part of a cycle C of G(x′,p)
gets deleted and, hence, every iteration deletes a cycle from the spending graph. Throughout these
modifications, we maintain the invariant that (x′,p) is an equilibrium of the given Fisher marketM.
These observations establish the stated claim and are detailed below.
Proof of Correctness: Since in every iteration the graph G = G(x′,p) considered by the algorithm
is bipartite, the selected cycles are always of even length. Hence, as we alternately add and subtract
the least weight though a cycle, no agents total spending ever changes. Specifically, consider a cycle
i1j1i2j2 . . . ikjki1 in G. Without loss of generality, we can assume that (i1, j1) is the least weight edge
in the spending graph and let w be the weight associated with this edge. We will delete the edge
(i1, j1) by subtracting the weight w from it and alternately add and subtract w throughout the cycle.
Hence for any agent (say agent iℓ), we increase iℓ’s spending on jℓ−1 by w and decrease iℓ’s spending
on j(ℓ+1) mod k)) by w. Hence the total amount spent by any agent does not change. Moreover, as w
is the least weight of any edge in the cycle, adding or subtracting any agents spending on any good
in the cycle by w will maintain the non-negativity of all the spendings. Therefore, throughout the
execution of the algorithm, the budget-exhaustion condition is maintained.
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For any good jℓ on the cycle, the consumption by agent iℓ decreases byw/pjℓ and the consumption
of this good by the agent i(ℓ+1) mod k)) goes up byw/pjℓ . Therefore, themarket-clearing conditions are
maintained as well. Finally, the maximum bang-per-buck condition is also maintained. This follows
from the fact that in x agents only spent on goods which provided them maximum bang-per-buck
and in x′ agents only spend on a subset of goods that they originally spent on in x.
These observations imply that Algorithm 2 maintains the invariant that (x′,p) is an equilibrium
of M. From the condition in the while-loop, it is clear that the algorithm terminates if and only if
G(x′,p) is a forest. We will now complete the proof of the claim by showing that Algorithm 2 termi-
nates in poly(n,m) time.
Run-Time Analysis: In each iteration of the algorithm we delete one edge from G(x′,p) and never
add a new edge to the graph. Therefore, the algorithm iterates at most nm times. Furthermore, each
iteration runs in strongly polynomial time, since it entails finding a cycle and a minimum weight
edge on it. Therefore, Algorithm 2 terminates in strongly polynomial time. This completes the proof.
B Hardness of Finding Integral Equilibria
Theorem B.1. It is NP-hard to determine whether a given Fisher market admits an integral equilibrium or
not.
Proof. We establish the hardness of determining whether a market is pure by reducing the partition
problem to it. Recall that in the partition problem, we are given a set S = {s1, s2, . . . , sm} of positive
integers and the goal is to find a 2-partition (S1, S2) of S such that the sum of the numbers in S1
is equal to the sum of number in S2. Given an instance of the partition problem with m positive
integers, we will construct a market with two agents and m goods,M = 〈[2], [m],V, e〉. Here, both
agents have equal budget, e1 = e2 =
1
2
∑
s∈S s, and identical, additive valuation v1,j = v2,j = sj for
all j ∈ [m].
Note that (x,p) is an integral equilibrium ofM iff:
• Market clearing: x = (x1,x2) is a partition of [m]; in particular, for all j ∈ [m] we have j ∈
x1 ∪ x2.
• Maximum bang-per-buck allocation: for both the agents i ∈ {1, 2} and for each good j ∈ xi the
MBB condition implies that
vi,j
pj
= maxj′∈[m]
vi,j′
p′j
. Since both agents have the same valuation,
we have
sj
pj
=
sj′
pj′
for all j.j′ ∈ [m].
• Budgets exhaustion:
∑
j∈xi
pj = ei for all i ∈ {1, 2}. Therefore,
∑
j pj = e1 + e2 =
∑
s∈S s. This
along with the fact that
sj
pj
=
sj′
pj′
for all j, j′ ∈ [m] implies that p = (s1, s2, . . . , sm).
This implies that (x,p) is a market outcome ofM iff p = (s1, s2, . . . , sn) and
∑
j∈x1
sj =
∑
j∈x1
pj = e1 = e2 =
∑
j∈x1
pj =
∑
j∈x2
sj.
Hence, there exists a integral equilibrium forM iff there exists a 2-partition (S1, S2) of S such that
the sum of the numbers in S1 is equal to the sum of the numbers in S2. This establishes the stated
claim.
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C Comparative Example
This section provides an example of a Fisher market wherein Alg outperforms (in terms of budget
perturbations) the algorithm developed in [BKV18].
Consider a market that consists of 4n−1 goods and 2n agents, each with a budget of 1. The first n
agents value the first 2n goods uniformly at n. In addition, the first n agents have a value of zero for
the last 2n − 1 goods. The last n agents value the first 2n goods uniformly at (1 − ε) and their value
for each of the last 2n− 1 goods is equal to one.
At equilibrium, each of the first 2n goods will be priced at 1/2. In addition, the equilibrium prices
of last 2n − 1 goods will be n/(2n− 1), each.
Therefore, via Theorem 3.6, we can find a pure market by perturbing the budgets no more than
n/(2n − 1) ≈ 1/2. Next, we will show that the pure market obtained via the algorithm in [BKV18]
leads to a budget perturbation of ≈ 3/4.
The algorithm of Barman et al. [BKV18] would start with a welfare-maximizing allocation, i.e., it
would start by allocating (i) the first 2n goods among the first n agents and (ii) the last 2n − 1 goods
among the last n agents. Note that, under this allocation, one of the last n agents gets less than two
goods. In [BKV18] the prices are initialized to be equal to the valuations; one can normalize them
after the termination of the algorithm to ensure that the sum of prices is equal to the sum of the
budgets, i.e., equal to n.
Since this initial allocation is not price envy-free up to one good, the algorithm of Barman et al. [BKV18]
would scale the prices up and, in particular, increase the prices of the last 2n − 1 goods to n each. At
this point of time, price envy-freeness up to one good is achieved and the algorithm would termi-
nate. Overall, the method in [BKV18] will find a solution in which every good is priced at n and there
exists an agent who receives exactly one good; the remaining agents will obtain two goods, each.
Note that, at this point, however, the sum of prices is T := 2n · n + (2n − 1) · n = 4n2 − n. To get
the sum of prices back to nwe scale them down by T/n. Hence, the budget of the agent with a single
good scales down to n n
T
= n
2
4n2−n
≈ 14 . Therefore, the change in the budget of this agent is about
1 − 1/4 = 3/4. As mentioned previously, the algorithm developed in the present paper would lead
to a budget perturbation of close to 1/2 and, hence, will perform better on this instance.
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